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The growing misuse of information technology and the increased dependence on computer technology and systems 
heightened the requirements for information security. Unfortunately there often is a feeling of apathy towards information 
security by management, which leads to an ad hoc approach to information security and resultant information and 
financial losses. 
 
The main objective of the research thus was to determine the current state of information security at a large 
manufacturing company in South Africa.  The methodology entailed a field study of which three sets of structured 
questionnaires on information security were an important component. Based on a literature study concerning the ideal 
information security and control situation and the results of the three sets of questionnaires it was possible to determine 
the gap, problem areas and issues of information security and control at the manufacturing company. The research clearly 
indicated that numerous areas for improvement exist and therefore proposes a framework for the management of 
information security. Although a completely secure information system may not be attainable, the valuable information 






The 2000s are characterised by continual and rapid change 
in technology.  One specific aspect that is having a major 
impact on everyday life is the phenomenon generally known 
as the information explosion. Information has in fact 
become the essential ingredient for profits and success (Du 
Toit, 1992:9).  In the bid to use this massive volume of 
information economically and effectively, computers 
increasingly play a more significant role.  This increased 
dependence on computer technology and computer-based 
information systems in organisations to enable diverse 
business activities, has redefined corporate risk and thus 
necessitated closer scrutiny of security practices and 
procedures to offset the risk inherent in giving more people 
access to computer systems (Lubbe & Armstrong, 1995:19; 
Pottas, 1995: vi, 3; Von Solms, 1993:1). 
 
Requirements for security have escalated to the protection of 
a myriad of autonomous and integrated information systems, 
data and information residing on mainframes, 
minicomputers, servers, workstations and personal 
computers (Scott, 1996:1; Eloff, 1980:1). It is therefore 
necessary that the confidentiality, integrity and availability 
of information should be ensured on all levels (Menzies, 
1993: 164-165). 
 
Despite numerous management claims that information is 
one of the most valuable and strategic corporate assets 
(Pfleeger, 1989:299; also compare Clarke, 1976:1; Davis & 
Olson, 1987:216; Du Toit, 1992:7; Christoffersson, Ekhall, 
Fåk, Herda, Matgtila, Price, & Widman, 1988:1), there is 
often not much pressure from executive level or adequate 
funding to ensure that information stored on computer 
systems is protected from bumbling, break-ins, electronic 
fraud, viruses, and natural disasters (compare Louw, 
1990:213; Pfleeger, 1989:2; Rilley, 1981:5; Thibodeau, 
1997). Many organisations do not implement an active 
information security plan, and when implemented it is often 
done half-heartedly (Van Dyk, 1990:18).  It is also true that 
management often conceal the truth about the status of 
information security in their organisations (Stang, 1992:16). 
Although management may be well aware of the 
shortcomings and dangers with regard to information 
security, they often rationalise and believe their own 
fabrication (Highland, 1993:2). 
 
Linked to this apathy towards security by senior 
management, De Ru (1992:3) pointed out, is the growing 
concern regarding the ability of current tools, methods, 
procedures, solutions, and human resources to meet the 
information security challenges and issues confronting 
management in the years to come (compare also Pfleeger, 
1989:xix; Witten, 1990:105). While the use of information 
technology is increasing, misuse and security risks 
associated with the deployment of information technology 
are increasing even faster and often results in huge financial 
losses (Applegate, Austin & McFarlan, 2003:424; Rilley, 
1981:2-3; Wong & Watt, 1990:1-2).  Industrial espionage, 
fraud, crime and subterfuge are escalating in frequency and 
in adverse impact on victim organisations (Wong & Watt, 
1990:2). It is also a well-known fact that computer crimes 







Besides all the above-mentioned problems, normal operating 
conditions and natural disasters (fire, water, and power 
failures) pose their own risks.  Taken together with inherent 
flaws of fourth and fifth generation programming languages 
with respect to data control and validation, the powerfulness 
of search engines, audit trail and error recovery, as well as 
the increased network sharing with outside organisations, 
office automation, electronic mail, electronic data 
interchange, and unattended operation, it is quite clear that 
top management can no longer ignore the security of the 
valuable information asset (compare Denning, 1990:iii-iv; 
Wong & Watt, 1990:15-20).  Although the Communications 
and Electronic Transactions Act, Act 25 of 2002 (South 
Africa, 2002) brought some improvement, South African 
legislature is still relatively inadequate (compare Snyman, 
1999:4). If it is born in mind that South African legislation 
is not moving fast enough to deter hackers or fraudsters 
(Middleton, 2001:1), it becomes evident that many hackers 
go undetected and unprosecuted (Camp, 2000:54; Campling, 
1997:1).  
 
Information security can thus not remain a technical issue, 
delegated to technical specialists, but will have to become a 
business issue, addressed by corporate executive 
management (Wong & Watt, 1990:20). This urgency for the 
addressing of information security by senior management is 
furthermore highlighted by the inherent danger of the 
continuing departure from traditional mainframe computing 
to departmental computing, distributed platforms, 
decentralised security, the ‘openness’ of today’s systems 
architectures, greater accessibility, interconnectivity, 
networks, and a large scale connection to the relatively 
insecure Internet (Claassen, 1994:1-1; Cohan, 1999:88; 
Eloff, 1995:39; Heydenrych, 1996:16; Menaugh, 1997; 
Smith, 1996; Sundaram, 1998).  
 
A South African case study 
 
Because of the above-mentioned aspects, it is of the utmost 
importance that information security is addressed in every 
organisation. The urgent necessity for information security 
is also found in the highly competitive manufacturing world. 
This article will therefore report on a study of information 
security and control at a large and diversified manufacturing 
company that produces a rich variety of products.  
 
The company makes extensive use of computerised 
information, local and wide area networks, the Internet, as 
well as distributed computing and dial-in lines, which 
emphasise the importance and necessity to study the current 
level of information security and control. This connectivity 
dramatically increases the vulnerability of the information 
resource. Therefore some information security control 
measures, for example identification procedures and 
passwords, were implemented. A proxy server, firewall, as 
well as authentication and identification procedures, and 
passwords protect access to the Internet.  
 
Certain dynamic changes in the computer environment of 
the company lead to an increase in information security risks 
and threats. Some of the more important changes were 
 
• a dramatic increase in the use of personal computers; 
 
• an increase in the use of local and wide area networks; 
 
• an ever-increasing dependency on information; 
 
• totally new information needs; 
 
• an increasing complexity and integration of systems 
and technology; and 
 
• an increasing end user involvement. 
 
These changes in the information technology environment 
inevitably lead to an increase in the following information 
security risks and threats: fraud and theft; violation of 
information privacy and security; loss of resources and 
finances; sabotage and industrial espionage; and misuse of 
assets and resources. 
 
Evaluating information security 
 
There is little doubt that security problems will increase 
because of the dramatic growth in information technology. 
Computer crime and fraud will become more sophisticated 
and popular, as organisations become more and more 
dependent on information systems. If senior management 
therefore does not address the various information security 
threats, it can lead to a variety of information security 
problems and computer crimes. 
 
The major information security threats currently 
experienced are external threats, internal threats, accidental 
threats, hardware misuse, computer fraud and crime, 
intrusions, masquerading, pest programs, bypasses, active 
misuse, passive misuse, and indirect misuse (Applegate et 
al., 2003:433-439). Although it is not possible to build a 
completely secure information system and to eliminate all 
threats and problems, it is possible to minimise the impact 
and business disruption by following a total systems 
approach and by paying attention to risk analysis, risk 
monitoring and risk control. 
 
Various information security controls can thus be 
implemented, for example administrative, physical, 
procedural, operational, information systems, systems 
development and last resort control measures. Synergy 
between the various components of information security is 
however a necessity. 
 
To determine the state of information security at an 
organisation it is necessary to evaluate the various aspects 
that are threatened, as well as the level of implementation of 




The empirical research focused on the awareness of the 
ever-increasing information security risks, the effectiveness 
of the currently implemented security solutions, tools, 
available human resources, as well as the security concerns 






For the purpose of the research, elements of survey-based 
feedback were used as a diagnostic approach. The main tool 
for the collection of data was three sets of questionnaires. 
Three groups were targeted for the distribution of the 
questionnaires, namely general computer users, 
departmental and functional heads, and information 
technology support personnel. The population was stratified 
(compare Huysamen, 1994:40-41; Lind & Mason, 
1994:211-212) in order to determine three important 
perspectives, namely that of the general employees, 
management, and the information technology personnel. 
The stratification also ensured that general computer users 
did not have to answer management or specialised 
information technology questions. In all three groups the 
units of analysis (compare Huysamen, 1994:38) were the 
computer users at the manufacturing company. 
 
Because the population of computer users is a finite 
population, it was decided to use the whole population for 
all three groups of computer users and not to make use of 
sampling techniques. If it is kept in mind that the average 
response to questionnaires is about thirty percent or lower, a 
sample would be too small to make valid deductions 
(compare Huysamen, 1994:149-150). A total of 121 
computer users were thus identified as the population. The 
questionnaires were furnished to all computer users at the 
manufacturing company according to a list of the relevant 
units of analysis.  
 
The first part of the questionnaires mainly obtained 
biographical data of respondents and thus included questions 
concerning the demographic and personal particulars of 
users, while the rest of the questionnaires measured the 
general perception of the main aspects of information 
security at the manufacturing company. 
 
After the questionnaires were received back all responses 
were carefully scrutinised for completeness, consistency and 
errors (compare Berenson & Levine, 1996:31), and to 
eliminate questionable data (compare Steyn, Smit, Du Toit, 
& Strasheim, 1994:3). Out of the total of 121 questionnaires 
distributed, 56 questionnaires were received back, which 
means a 46.3% total response rate. The response rates for 
the three respective groups are presented in Table 1. 
 
The differences in the composition of the population and the 
composition of the respondents were negligible as can be 
seen from Table 2 on the next page. 
 
The responses included nominal data (responses to the 
demographic questions), as well as ordinal data on a four-
point Likert scale. The processing of the data was done by 
means of the Statistica for Windows program. In the 
processing of the data the major emphasis was on 
descriptive statistics to organise and summarise the 
numerical data (compare Lind & Mason 1994: 5-6). 
 
Contingency analysis was used to establish whether the 
demographic variables had an effect on the nominal data 
collected. A frequency distribution analysis and analysis of 
variance was used to identify the major information security 
problems that users experience, and to investigate the  
variation in the interval scaled variables. In order to evaluate 
the respective statements and questions, the following 
statistical procedures were performed: frequency 
distributions; histograms; the arithmetic mean, which is the 
most commonly used average or measure of central 
tendency (Berenson & Levine, 1996:106); and the 95% 
confidence intervals, which states the range within which 
the total population parameter is expected to lie (Berenson 
& Levine, 1996:344-348; Lind & Mason, 1994:225-228). 
To determine the representativeness and reliability of the 
mean, the standard deviation as measure of dispersion was 
calculated for each question (Berenson & Levine, 1996:120-
124). However, when a few extremely large and extremely 
small items are encountered in a set of data, the mean might 
not be an appropriate measure of central tendency (Lind & 
Mason, 1994:62). To overcome this problem and to 
determine the shape or symmetry of the frequency 





Fourteen aspects of information security were evaluated to 
determine the overall state of information security at the 
manufacturing company. The results of the evaluation 
described above are concisely summarised in Table 3. 
 
From Table 3 it is evident that in all fourteen areas the 
manufacturing company experienced problems with regard 
to information security. However, based on the number of 
problems experienced and the overall evaluation, some of 
the areas need more attention than others. A more detailed 





Microcomputer security is one aspect that seriously needs 
attention. No regular audit and review or a microcomputer 
security policy existed. Neither were backups, control of 
data, control of proprietary software, or encryption on an 
adequate level. When backups on microcomputers were 





Information security awareness – security standards were 
not communicated enough. Regular updates and reminders 
on information security are necessary to keep employees 
informed. Training of new employees in information 
security was almost non-existent and should be addressed. 
 
Information security policy – no formal information security 
document existed. Documentation on security matters did 
not really exist and were mostly left to the initiative and 
competence of employees. Formulated information security 
objectives or action plans also could not be traced. Plans 






Table 1: Response rate 
 





General computer users 81 34 41,98% 
Functional and departmental heads 35 18 51,43% 
Information technology support personnel 5 4 80,00% 
Total 121 56 46,28% 
 
Table 2: Differences between the composition of the population and respondents 
 
Group Population Respondents Difference 
General computer users 66,94% 60,71% -6,23% 
Departmental and functional heads 28,93% 32,14% 3,21% 
Information technology support personnel 4,13% 7,14% 3,01% 
 
Table 3: Evaluation of information security according to fourteen key areas 
 
Criterion Aspects evaluated Significant problems 
Microcomputer security 8 6 
Administrative security 25 16 
Procedural security 15 8 
Management of information security 12 6 
Operational security 33 16 
Contingency planning and disaster recovery 43 14 
Computer centre security 10 3 
Network security 28 8 
General security 50 13 
Internet security 8 2 
Virus security 12 3 
Information system security 29 6 
Physical security 69 13 




Personnel controls – the dividing of responsibilities was 
implemented as a control measure. Attention should, 
however, be paid to background checks on all new 
employees, rotation of critical jobs, non-disclosure 
agreements, and the enforcement of a clean desk policy. 
 
Security conscious environment – the general perception is 
that stringent security measures operate.  This perception 
does not, however, hold true for information security. The 
overall environment was all but information security 
conscious as was evident from the inadequate supervision of 





Logical access security – although authorisation controls 
were effective, many computers were left on when 
unattended and employees did not log off from the network 
when leaving the personal computer for more than fifteen 
minutes. This minimised the value of access control. 
Although passwords were unique it should be changed more 
regularly. Multiple log-ons should not be allowed. External 
or remote access (dial-in) was not according to accepted 
security standards. 
 
Data security – there was no specific person who reviewed 
new or existing data in terms of classifying it for storage and 
filing purposes or for the dissemination to potential users. 
Most of the data and information was available to all 
persons. There were a number of informal procedures, 
which did operate to limit personnel’s access to certain 
confidential information.  The classification of data, 
consistency across environments, standards, database 
encryption, off-site backup, the protection and disposal of 
sensitive documents, and the review of exceptions, need 
attention. 
 
Management of information security 
 
Attention will have to be paid to winning top management 
commitment. Although it seems that information 
management is important to senior management and that 
they accept their responsibility, it became evident that top 
management does not view the vulnerability of this strategic 
asset as a critical performance area. The result is that neither 
enough attention is paid to this problem, nor is enough funds 
allocated to do the job. Quite a few management aspects 
therefore need to be addressed. 
 
Provision of funds for information security – a major 
obstacle to information security being addressed is the lack 
of budget. The budget is the formalisation of the monetary 
implications of the business plans. The budget at the 
manufacturing company therefore reflected the relative lack 





Despite the high physical asset value of the computer 
systems, the budget had no specific item referring to 
information security. 
 
Security planning – another major obstacle to information 
security is the fact that security planning did not form part of 
the total strategic and business planning. In fact there was a 
lack of a total information security plan on the strategic 
level. Information security strategies also need to be more 
effective and aligned with business strategies. The 
effectiveness of the security administration needs attention. 
 
Assignment of specific responsibility – the information 
technology manager is responsible for information security, 
but because of an overload of work cannot pay justice to this 
very important task. Top management has not yet deemed it 
necessary to have a specialist information security manager 
to meet its needs in the information field. Although the 
information technology manager has created a personnel 
structure under him, no specific person has been assigned 
the task of information security. 
 
Assessment of organisational vulnerabilities, threats and 
risks – neither the management nor the information 
technology manager had any formal assessment of 
vulnerabilities, threats and associated risks to which the 
information resource is exposed. Until now little thought has 
been given to vulnerabilities such as fraud, theft, sabotage, 
espionage and other information security problems. 
 
Investigation of information security countermeasures – no 
active investigation of available and new countermeasures 
took place. A formal record of information security 
countermeasures could not be found. 
 
Risk management strategy – as a result of not having a 
formal assessment of vulnerabilities, threats and 
countermeasures, a formal risk management strategy to 
reduce the information security problem, did not exist.  Risk 
management was often done on an ad hoc basis or as a result 
of some incident. 
 
Implementation of countermeasures – because of the lack of 
a well defined risk management strategy and plan, there 
were no specific plans laid down to implement information 
security countermeasures. Countermeasures were often 
implemented when a person or incident requires some 
defensive attention to be given to a specific problem area. 
 
Monitoring and reviewing information security effectiveness 
– the security management function did no specific 
monitoring of its own accord in the area of information 
security. No regular audits of information security existed.  




Although most computer users viewed operations and 
maintenance security as of a high standard, quite a few 
aspects need to be corrected. 
 
Maintenance security – although mostly in order, 
procedures were not documented adequately; neither was 
enough being done about the training of personnel regarding 
emergencies. The separation of maintenance responsibilities 
was inadequate. Unauthorised parting and changing of 
sensitive programs were not always prevented. The request 
for updates was not reviewed by an independent party. 
 
Tape and disk library security – the management of the tape 
and disk library was not up to standards. The alarm and 
sprinkler system should be thoroughly revised. Degaussing 
of old tapes and disks should be implemented. Tapes 
authorised for release but not found, and tapes for which the 
responsible person was not identified, should be identified 
and resolved. Version numbers and creation dates for 
backups were not recorded. Programs and documentation 
were not always stored in a secure location. The inventory 
list should be updated more frequently and sign-out logs 
should be strictly used. The old master was not always 
retained and monitored by the librarian. 
 
Support service security – the security of support services is 
an aspect of information security that was assessed very 
low. Non-disclosure agreements were not used. 
Maintenance visitors were not supervised.  
 
Contingency planning and disaster recovery 
 
Contingency plan and backup – an aspect that was rated 
very negatively is contingency planning. Although some 
aspects of the contingency plan were in order, vital records 
have not been identified and classified, which made the 
orderly removal of important records in the event of a 
disaster impossible. The present contingency plan was not at 
all effective, did not contain clear instructions, and did not 
address the various levels of service interruption. Another 
alarming aspect is that the disaster recovery plan was not 
regularly tested, neither were there procedures to regularly 
update the plan. Overall user involvement, without which 
the successful implementation of a disaster recovery plan is 
almost impossible, was lacking. Alternative facilities or a 
disaster recovery site did not exist, with the result that 
resilience was very low and continuation of work in case of 
a disaster would be very unlikely. 
 
Natural disaster security – several precautions have been 
taken. Aspects that still need to be addressed are the fact that 
the walls, doors, partitions and floors of the server room will 
probably not withstand the spread of a fire, and that the 
sprinkling system cannot be pre-empted while personnel 
extinguish the fire manually to prevent machine damage. 
 
High quality self-locking doors with ‘panic bars’ on the 
inside at the server room were lacking. Access control to the 
building by the guards and electronic access control to the 
building need improvement because of the possibility of 
mob attacks. 
 
Disaster recovery – The company did not have an effective 
planned incident response or response team when an 





should be given to the establishing of a detailed incident 
response plan and a small response team. 
 
Insurance against power failures, errors, data and business 
losses were inadequate. 
 
Computer centre security 
 
The operations log that records any significant events and 
actions was not constantly maintained or inspected daily by 
management. A dangerous practise was that visitors to the 
computer area were not escorted. The level of physical 
access security, after hour access control and control of the 
removal of materials from the server area were inadequate 
and need attention. Access control, however, begins with 
access control to the building by the security guards and 




Although network security was perceived to be effective, the 
network was not adequately protected from attacks or 
constantly monitored. Serious shortcomings were that 
critical transmitted information was not encrypted, logins of 
a given user were not restricted to a specified workstation, 
the change of passwords was not restricted to the user only, 
and start-up scripts were not imposed. Another aspect that 





General security of the computer systems is quite good, 
except that of desktop or microcomputers, remote 
computing and laptops, which certainly should receive 
attention. 
 
General information security measures, which are regularly 
used, are virus detection software, secure modems, firewalls, 
and network access control software. Attention will have to 
be paid to token-based passwords, personal computer access 
controls, personal computer hardware security devices, 
terminal key locks, lock words, redundant communication, 
business continuity planning software, and security 
evaluation software.  
 
It also became apparent that single sign-on software, 
signature verification, telecommunications encryption, 
biometric authentication, message authentication, file 
encryption, and public-key cryptography are never used and 
should be investigated as a means of protection. Although 
non-disclosure agreements by personnel are not regarded as 




Internet security seems to be adequate. Passwords and 
firewalls are used as control techniques. Encryption is not 





Computer viruses remain an imminent threat and were 
widely experienced by employees and mostly affected 
microcomputers and to a lesser extent also the servers. 
Although several control measures are being used, a 
documented virus security policy, a definition of potential 
losses, and documented safe user practices did not exist. The 
major consequences of the computer virus attacks were a 
loss of time, functionality and data. Virus protection, 
especially on microcomputers, will have to be improved 
dramatically. 
 
Information system security 
 
Security of sensitive programs – although negatively 
evaluated, nothing could be concluded with certainty 
regarding the security of sensitive programs like the payroll, 
accounts payable, fixed assets, purchasing, and inventory 
control. These aspects probably need some attention. 
 
Input/output security – effective controls for point of origin 
review of the rejected sensitive transactions, and the 
correcting of errors in input/output at the point of origin 
have been established, but will need regular auditing. 
 
Storage security – there is no formal review of existing 
systems on a regular basis to determine whether redundant 
information is being kept. Version numbers and creation 
dates are not recorded. No classification scheme exists. 
Consistency across environments and data encryption are 
lacking. No off-site backups of data are kept. 
 
Telecommunications security – telecommunications security 
is adequate, except that encryption is not always used in the 




Although the general perception is that physical security is 
of a high standard, this is however not exactly true as is 
evident from the following shortcomings. 
 
Protection against natural disasters – The present walls, 
doors, partitions, and floors of the server areas will not resist 
the spread of fire. Sprinkling can unfortunately not be pre-
empted to allow personnel to take corrective action and to 
limit water damage. The number of sprinklers is inadequate. 
 
Physical access control – No high quality self-locking doors 
are being used and electronic access control is not effective. 
Especially access control in server areas and after hours 
access control need attention. Access control to the building 
by the security guards is also ineffective. All these problems 
mainly boil down to the fact that physical access control is 
not effectively managed. Inadequate controls over the 
removal of materials lead to losses. 
 
Remote site security – The level of security of remote sites is 






Systems development security 
 
Information systems development and documentation 
security is basically on an acceptable standard, but a few 
aspects will have to be addressed by management. 
 
Security of new programs and program changes - although 
all revisions are supported by written requests that need to 
be approved by management, procedures that prevent 
programs from being changed without consent of the user’s 
department do not exist and should be implemented. 
Unfortunately no full history of changes is maintained. 
 
Documentation  documentation security is poor. 
Documentation standards are not strictly enforced before 
new systems are implemented or existing ones are changed. 
Program documentation is also not adequately maintained. 
Classification schemes, disposal of sensitive documentation, 
protection of sensitive documentation and general standards 
need to be addressed. 
 
A managerial information security framework 
 
From the above discussion it is evident that a lack of 
security was found at the manufacturing company in all 
three basic aspects of security, namely confidentiality, 
integrity and availability (see Alexander, 1995:30; Louw, 
1990:76-77; Menzies, 1993:164-165; Olivier, 1991:9; 
Pritchard, 1979:13 for the three basic aspects of information 
security). To remain competitive in the highly competitive 
market the company will have to implement an information 
security framework and plan. Eventually this plan will have 
to be translated into detailed action plans with appointed 
responsible persons at all strategic business units. 
 
A possible framework for the management of information 
security is displayed in Figure 1 on the next page.  
 
From Figure 1 it is evident that this managerial framework 
for information security consists of the following major 
aspects. 
 
Senior management involvement 
 
Information security is a deliberate decision, rather than 
relying on security through obscurity. Senior management 
should recognise information resources as essential 
organisational assets that must be protected, educate 
themselves on security related issues, and take responsibility 
for decisions in this area. The efforts of high-level 
executives to understand and manage risks help to ensure 
that information security is taken seriously at lower levels in 
the organisation and that security programs have adequate 
resources. 
 
The responsibility for information security thus rests with 
senior management to install into their organisation a 
defensive threshold, which is high enough to make the 
investment in time and effort unprofitable to any potential 
adversary. Top management effects their involvement by 
defining and communicating a security policy, by allocating 
specific responsibilities to appointed people, by making 
resources available for the continual upkeep of information 
security and control, and by constantly monitoring and 
reviewing information security effectiveness. 
 
Information security policy 
 
Senior management implements a security framework and 
plan by starting off with the formulation of a corporate 
security policy and strategy that forms part of, and is aligned 
to, the total business strategy. 
 
The following steps can be followed in developing an 
information security policy (Stefanec, 2002:13-18): 
 
• Perform a threat and risk analysis for the organisation 
to determine the level of security that must be 
implemented. Practical risk assessment procedures are 
developed that link information security to business 
needs. The assessment should include environmental 
threats; hardware, software and liveware problems and 
failures; fraud and theft; as well as sabotage and 
industrial espionage. 
 
• Define a security policy for the entire organisation and 
use it as a guide for information security architecture. 
The architecture rest on the following points: 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, assurance and 
enforcement and is determined by an audit of the 
corporate information security infrastructure. The audit 
includes an analysis of the confidentiality and 
criticality of computer resources, an assessment of all 
the various information security threats, risks and 
vulnerabilities, as well as an investigation of the 
available countermeasures, safeguards and controls. 
 
• Create an information security implementation plan. 
Once the audit is completed, an information security 
plan and budget is submitted for approval by 
management. The budget for information security 
should be in line with the asset value of the 
information and information technology of the 
organisation and should enable the organisation to plan 
and set goals for information security programs. The 
budget should cover central staff salaries, training, and 
security software and hardware. In the establishment of 
a defensive threshold to deter potential adversaries, 
cost and benefits will have to be traded off against one 
another. 
 
• Assign accountability. Programme and business 
managers should be made accountable for information 
security. Business managers should be held 
accountable for managing the information security 
risks associated with their operations, just as they are 
held accountable for other business risks. Security 
specialists in these organisations should have an 
advisory role, and it includes keeping the management 
informed about risks. Similarly, program managers 
must determine which of their information resources 
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Figure 1: Framework for the management of information security 
 
 
Aspects that need to be considered in the information 
security policy are: security aspects that includes aspects of 
strategic nature, as well as the long term impact and 
implications; insurance aspects that involves the 
management of asset and resource risk in order to ensure the 
survival and effective functioning of the organisation; 
aspects regarding the organisation structure, which 
comprises personnel practise, as well as the structure within 
which the computer environment is organised; contingency 
and disaster recovery aspects; systems development aspects 
that describes the methodology to successfully develop 
application systems; and maintenance aspects. 
 
The formulation of policy is unfortunately not a once-off 
exercise and should be reviewed constantly in order to 
ensure that it is still appropriate to the ever-changing 




After the establishment of policies and strategies, it is 
necessary for successful implementation of the required 
administrative, physical, procedural, operational, 
information systems, systems development controls, as well 
as controls of last resort.  A possibility is to follow an 
architectural approach. An architectural approach implies a 
proactive understanding of how information is used 
throughout the organisation and its corresponding security 
requirements. Thus the following two aspects must be 
secured: 
• Continuity of computing services (the availability 
aspect of security) by the establishment of strict 
maintenance service standards, the provision of 
redundant support services, strict change control 
standards, strict back up procedures, and training of 
employees. 
 
• Control of access to information (the confidentiality 
and integrity aspects) through logical access control 
and user accountability. Authentication can be obtained 





Due to the fact that information security is a constant 
process, continuous attention should be paid to security. To 
determine the effectiveness of the control measures and to 
enforce the implemented safeguards the security manager 
and his personnel do continuous monitoring of risk and 
security effectiveness, regular security audits, and if 
necessary maintenance work to ensure the required level of 
information security and compliance with the information 
security policy.  
 
Resource elements which can be used by management for 







• A security committee and team to co-ordinate and 
implement all aspects regarding information security. 
 
• Internal and external audits to ensure that information 
security meets the policy, procedures, and rules 
stipulated by management. 
 
• Quality assurance to ensure that standards and 
prerequisites will be met. 
 
• Security administration that administrates and regulates 
information security. 
 
Creating an information security conscious 
environment 
 
Unlike popular believe, the successful protection of 
information does not hinge entirely on technological 
developments, but is also a matter of security awareness by 
senior management and all employees. It is therefore 
important that management initiates a security awareness 
program by training management and all new employees in 
information security, by providing regular information 
security updates and newsletters, and by creating an 
information security inducive environment. Many of the 
security problems and threats can be eliminated if the 
ordinary employee takes it on him- or herself to be part of 
the solution to information security.  
 
An inducive environment to facilitate information security 
can be created by doing the following: 
 
• Starting with a comprehensive awareness program. 
Attention-getting and user-friendly techniques should 
be used in the awareness programme. Techniques can 
include intranet web sites that explain policies, 
standards, procedures; alerts and special notices; 
awareness videos with messages from top managers 
about the security program; interactive presentations 
by security staff with various user groups; security 
awareness days; and products with security related 
slogans. 
 
• Training and education programs, which emphasise the 
information security threats and vulnerabilities, faced 
by the organisation. All new employees should go 
through an introductory computer security course, with 
a refresher course at least every year; 
 
• Thorough planning of all aspects of information 
security;.  
• Clear information security policy statements, standards 
and guidelines. 
 
• Well documented procedures for information security. 
 
• Implementation of information security. 
 
• Top management commitment to the strict enforcing of 




The present age is an age of information insecurity. 
Therefore organisations will have to accept that security is a 
cost of doing business. Since information security is a 
moving target where perpetrators are constantly looking for 
new ways to attack, information security is not something a 
company can do once and then forget about. But ensuring 
information security on an enterprise wide network is often 
practically an elusive goal and may even be unattainable 
because in today’s distributed networked environment open 
access to information takes precedence over the protection 
of information integrity and confidentiality. However, 
various measures and controls can be implemented to 
improve information security. 
 
There is little doubt that information security is more of a 
management issue than a technical issue and that it should 
be managed according to the level of risk and potential 
threats to the organisation. The type and profile of the 
organisation as well as its business and its objectives 
influence the level of risk.  The higher the competitive 
environment of the organisation, the more information it 
needs and thus the security risks increase. A fairly low 
profile organisation with a low level of competitive 
environment has a low security need.  If this statement is 
used as a platform, it can then be said that that information 
security can be managed through a series of general and 
application controls that can prevent threats, or detect and 
control the effects of damage if a disaster, security violation 
or failure takes place. To ensure efficiency of these controls 
regular audits, monitoring and critical incidence 
reproduction tests should be carried out (Bryson, 1997:341). 
 
Perhaps security is a journey without end. Menaugh (1997) 
said that having the right mind-set for information security 
is not ‘a question of whether or not you’re paranoid, it is 
rather whether you’re paranoid enough’. In this new age of 
cybercrime, probably the only totally secure computer 
system is the one that has been switched off. However, if 
information security is implemented properly so that it does 
not overkill, ignore or produce a false sense of security, it 
will limit the risks to which the organisation is exposed. 
 
Therefore, if the researched manufacturing company is any 
indication of the state of information security in 
manufacturing organisations, information security in the 
manufacturing environment in South Africa should receive 
much more attention and investment. Unlike the USA who 
took information security much more serious after the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (Applegate et al., 
2003:432), South Africa need a more structured approach to 
information security. Management will have to take the 
escalating threat to information security much more serious 
by building defences to secure companies’ information 
related assets. It should never be a once-off issue, but should 
form part of the corporate business strategy. Information 
security is not an event, but a constant and complex process.  
 
However, to determine the state of information security in 
South Africa a much more comprehensive study involving 
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